ASEAN Economic Integration: Driven by Markets,
Bureaucrats or Both?
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(1) Introduction
The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, was established in August 1967. It is arguably the most durable and successful regional association in the developing world. In a region that had been plagued by conflict during the preceding quarter of a century, and divided by a diverse colonial past, ASEAN has first and foremost forged diplomatic cohesion among its population of almost 600 million people. Formed initially by leaders of five of the member countries 1 , the Bangkok Declaration was broad and general in its seven objectives. These included:
'To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region … To promote regional peace and stability…. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance … in the economic, social, cultural, technical, and administrative spheres.'
Subsequently, it has developed into a close-knit grouping with around 700 meetings each year on economic, political, cultural, educational and security matters. The Association has also been able to effectively project itself regionally and internationally through a wide range of initiatives.
Four broad characteristics define ASEAN. First, it is a region of great diversity, probably more so than any other grouping in the world. Indeed, its economic, political, cultural and linguistic diversity is greater than that of the European Union, for example. This diversity was accentuated by colonial era experiences, with Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore part of the British empire, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam annexed by the French, Indonesia ruled by the Dutch, the Philippines under first Spanish then American rule, while Thailand was never formally colonized. 2 Political structures are equally diverse, including freewheeling democracies (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines), communist states (Laos and Vietnam), a constitutional democracy with a highly influential monarchy (Thailand), heavily managed democracies with one party in continuous rule since independence (Malaysia and Singapore), a military-dominated authoritarian state (Myanmar), and an all-powerful sultanate (Brunei).
ASEAN includes one very wealthy nation (Singapore) alongside some of the world's poorest, on mainland Southeast Asia. The per capita income of the richest is about 80 times that of the (imperfectly measured) poorest member. It includes the world's two largest archipelagic states (Indonesia and the Philippines) together with the citystate of Singapore, and the tiny oil sultanate of Brunei. It includes the world's fourth most populous nation (Indonesia), three states with populations of between 60 and 90 million people (The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), while Singapore and Laos have less than five million people and Brunei less than half a million.
Second, most of the countries have achieved rapid economic development for most of the past quarter century, and longer in some cases. Four of them -Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand -were classified by the World Bank (1993) as 'miracle' economies. Since the late 1980s, the three Indo China states have successfully engineered a transition from plan to market with significantly increased growth rates and sharp reductions in poverty. The region's economic dynamism and steadily expanding cooperation have constituted a virtuous circle, with the increased regional harmony created by the formation of ASEAN providing an enabling and more conducive business environment. Nevertheless, membership of ASEAN has been no guarantee of economic success. Two of its members, Myanmar and the Philippines, in the early development economics literature both expected to be success stories, have under-performed, the former disastrously so.
Third, ASEAN diplomacy and cooperation have been characterized by caution, pragmatism and consensus-based decision-making. The so-called 'ASEAN Way' has entailed non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and lowestcommon-denominator decision-making. ASEAN leaders have deliberately avoided creating a strong supra-national regional institution, and the ASEAN Secretariat has been deliberately underpowered, serving more as a diplomatic facilitator and conference organizer rather than a strong EU-type agency. These characteristics constitute both strengths and weaknesses: they explain the Association's durability, but they limit its effectiveness and capacity for strong and decisive action.
Fourth, and related to the third observation, ASEAN has never been, and probably will never be, an EU type organization, nor even a NAFTA-type economic bloc. That is, it is unlikely to adopt a common external trade regime, with completely free commerce among the member states, in the foreseeable future. In fact, although it appears in a formal sense to be a quasi-preferential trading bloc, in practice, most of its trade liberalization measures have been multilateralized as part of unilateral domestic reforms in each country. Moreover, the Association is even less likely to develop formal mechanisms for macroeconomic policy coordination, leading for example to a common currency and central bank. A key challenge for ASEAN is therefore to define a role for itself, especially since Asia's two giants, China and India, are now growing faster than the ASEAN economies in aggregate. Will it, as some commentators contend, be forever at the crossroads, institutionally unable to establish a stronger variant of economic cooperation, and therefore confined to a looser association, a forum for leaders to discuss issues of regional interest?
This chapter aims to provide the reader with a stand-alone introduction to the ASEAN economies, and traces its evolution focussing on its programs of economic integration. It also critically evaluates its past performance and, based on this, examines prospects for its future.
Our organization is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 10 economies, and the development of ASEAN as an institution. Section 3 examines ASEAN economic cooperation and integration with reference to merchandise trade, which was the principal focus of initiatives for the first quarter century. Section 4 then investigates a range of 'trade plus' measures, including efforts to develop a broader range of closer economic relations both within and beyond the region, against the backdrop of expanded membership, the Asian financial crisis, the rise of China, and rapidly evolving regional commercial architecture. Concluding observations are presented in section 5.
(2) ASEAN and ASEAN Economic Development (2.1) The Evolution of ASEAN There are four more or less distinct phases in the evolution of ASEAN (Table 1) . The first phase commenced with its establishment in 1967, in a highly uncertain regional and global environment over-shadowed by conflict. This was at the height of the cold war, the Indo China conflict was at its peak, and China was in the throws of its cultural revolution. Indonesia had only recently renounced its intention to 'crush' Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore had separated after a brief union, Malaysia and the Philippines were in dispute over Sabah, and there were (or had been recently) significant leftist insurgencies in all but Singapore. Thailand was widely regarded in the West as a likely next 'domino' to fall to the communist advance. Earlier attempts at establishing a regional association, such as ASA, the Association of Southeast Asia, and a possible three-nation 'Malay' grouping, Maphilindo, had not progressed. A major facilitating factor in the 1967 meeting and declaration was regime change in Indonesia in early 1966, with the Soeharto administration signaling its intention to rejoin the international community, to focus on economic development, and to seek better relations with its neighbours. Then, as now, ASEAN has been able to progress only as fast as its dominant power.
( Table 1about here)
The vision of the leaders therefore focused primarily on establishing regional harmony. While all were strongly anti-communist in outlook, they explicitly emphasized socio-economic cooperation and development rather than defence and security. In 1969 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers commissioned a study on ASEAN economic cooperation to be conducted by the United Nations. The resulting report, known as the Kansu Report (after its leader, Professor G. Kansu), was completed in 1972. But it was not widely circulated, and was not formally published until 1974 (as United Nations, 1974). Its recommendations on economic cooperation reflected both popular thinking at the time as well as the inclination of ASEAN member countries. Specifically, it proposed trade liberalization through selective, or productby-product tariff negotiations, package deal arrangements for large industrial projects, and financial cooperation.
Meanwhile, various cooperation activities had commenced, including reports by various committees covering commerce and industry, agriculture, tourism, transport and telecommunications. As early as 1971, for example, the commerce and industry committee was exploring the possibility of trade fairs and cooperation, trade liberalization, harmonization of trade statistics, and industrial complementation projects. The spirit of the Kansu report was broadly accepted, including in principle the notions of joint industrial projects and of reciprocity among the parties involved.
The second phase commenced with the Bali Summit of the five leaders in February 1976. This marked the beginning of a formal set of regional cooperation measures. These comprised the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (APTA), the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs), the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs). APTA, the most significant of the four, represented the first attempt to promote intra-ASEAN trade through institutional integration and regional trade preferences. The AIPs, on the other hand, were designed to establish in each member country a large-scale, inter-governmental project. The AIC and the AIJVs were aimed at promoting specialization in complementary products and to facilitate the pooling of resources.
These initiatives were broadly consistent with the Kansu and other reports. They reflected the desire on the part of leaders to 'put some flesh on the bones' of regional cooperation, at least in a minimal, non-threatening sense. They were generally similar to other regional initiatives being promoted in the developing world, notably in Latin America, the Caribbean and East Africa. A major trigger was the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975 and communist take-overs in Cambodia and Laos. ASEAN meanwhile became a more active organization in international affairs. It began to caucus as a group, for example in the United Nations and on issues of common concern, such as market access for its labour-intensive manufactures and tropical cash crops. Dialogue-partner relationships with a wide array of countries and regions were established, and some of these formed the basis for subsequent regional architecture initiatives. ASEAN also began to be active diplomatically, especially its attempt to isolate Vietnam for its role in the removal of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.
However, none of the four economic cooperation programs had any significant impact on regional economic relations (Imada and Naya, eds, 1992). Indeed, they were explicitly designed to have minimal effect. In spite of the early enthusiasm, the APTA had little impact on intra-regional trade. The tariff cuts were not implemented on an across-the-board basis but rather on product-by-product basis. Hence the commodity coverage was narrow, the tariff cuts were too small to have any discernible effect on trade, 3 and in addition implementation was half-hearted. Moreover, APTA failed to deal with NTBs, which were generally a more serious impediment to trade than tariffs. The AIP, AIC and AIJVs also had limited success.
In the case of the AIJVs, for example, the Philippines and Thailand were in dispute over wanting to produce the same automotive parts (Ajanant, 1997) . More generally, the failure of these initiatives was symptomatic of the members' unwillingness and unpreparedness to pursue either trade liberalization or regional integration at the time. Notions of infant industry were still popular.
There was little further progress during the 1980s. Brunei's accession in 1984 occurred as that country became independent. During 1984-87, the Philippines was engulfed in economic and political crisis, and effectively disengaged from ASEAN. The collapse in commodity prices in the mid 1980s pushed both Indonesia and Malaysia -and by extension Singapore -into recession, in turn prompting swift and effective reforms, but lessening interest in the broader regional agenda.
A third phase commenced in 1992 with another leaders' Summit at which the ASEAN Free Trade Area, AFTA, was announced. This marked a clear break with the past. The emphasis was on stronger economic cooperation: for the first time, 'free trade' was the regional objective, there was a clear timetable for implementation, and a 'negative list' approach was adopted, in that all goods trade was to be included within AFTA unless explicitly excluded. The six leaders agreed to reduce the common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) rates to 0-5% Given the importance of FDI in the region, ASEAN was one of the first regional groupings in the 'South' to adopt formal instruments to try to promote and protect cross-border investment among its members. A number of agreements were signed, the most significant of which was the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) in October 1998, which was subsequently expanded and However, just as the original leaders' dream of 'one Southeast Asia' was being realized, in mid 1997 the Asian financial crisis (AFC) suddenly erupted. What transpired in its aftermath is now well known. Notwithstanding its ferocity, the impact of the AFC was surprisingly short-lived. Most of the crisis economies experienced a V-shaped recovery, although they have generally returned to somewhat lower growth trajectories. For ASEAN as an institution, the crisis had two principal effects. First, the region as a whole lost some of its commercial attractiveness, especially as China and India were largely unaffected by the crisis. Moreover, ASEAN was seen by many as an ineffective and feeble institution, unable to respond decisively at a time of crisis. In addition to the AFC, it was unable to play any role in the two other major regional flashpoints of that period, the Timor crisis of 1998-99 and the forest fires of 1997-98.
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Second, the crisis led to a general rethink about the future of economic cooperation, and the need for some sort of coordinated macroeconomic response capacity to avert such future events. This led to the current fourth phase in the evolution of ASEAN, dominated by two key features. These are the return to growth (at least until 2008 and the onset of the global financial crisis), and the struggle to define its rationale and identity, against the backdrop of a fast-changing regional and global environment, including a plethora of initiatives affecting commercial policy architecture. The first is the spread of PTAs. Singapore in particular, frustrated with slow pace of ASEAN, began to break ranks and embark on a bold strategy of PTAs. Although causing strain within the grouping, this had momentum or domino effects, with other ASEAN countries, especially Thailand, feeling compelled to follow.
Second, there has been a recognition that ASEAN is too small to address some of the broader, post-crisis macroeconomic coordination issues. For example, ASEAN is too small to seriously contemplate coordinated macroeconomic policy, such as for example a common exchange rate. In the case of emergency and crisis prevention measures, including currency swaps and fiscal standby agreements, the huge international reserves accumulated in North Asia dictate that these economies will be the major players in any regional and international agreements on such issues.
Third, ASEAN has now largely completed the 'easy phase' of intra-regional trade liberalization. As of 2009, zero tariffs applied to 64% of the products in the Inclusion List of the ASEAN-6. The average tariff for ASEAN-6 under the CEPT scheme is down to 1.5%, from 12.8% when the tariff cutting exercise commenced in 1993.
What remains are the politically more sensitive areas, heavy industry and food crops in particular. An unstated tenet of ASEAN trade liberalization is that the concessions would be 'multilateralized' as long as it was politically acceptable domestically for the signatories to do so. But for more contentious liberalizations, progress has been slower and exemptions have proliferated. For example, Indonesia has imposed rice import bans periodically. As food prices rose sharply in 2008, there was a free-for-all in the regional rice markets, with talk of a 'Mekong rice cartel' among exporters, and the then president of the Philippines (now the world's largest rice importer) announcing that her country would buy rice 'at any price'. Each country has sought to protect its steel industry. Malaysia has been reluctant to liberalize its auto trade barriers for fear of competition from Thailand, the regional leader in this industry. In addition to these barriers at the border, a further obstacle to the notion of 'ASEAN as a single market' has been the proliferation of sub-national barriers, particularly in Indonesia, where many provincial and kabupaten governments have introduced illegal levies on cross-border transport (McCulloch, ed, 2009). 6 Fourth, the rise of fragmentation trade called into question the viability of all forms of PTA's that do not multilateralize their concessions. East Asia has been the dominant player in this fast-growing segment of international trade, which involves the physical relocation of stages of the production process that can be transferred to lower-cost sites.
7 Parts and components in the electronics and automotive industries have been the major segment of this trade, although it is now spreading rapidly to (poorly measured) services trade through BTO facilities. Within East Asia, the ASEAN countries stand out for their heavy dependence on production fragmentation trade. In 2005-06, for example, parts and components accounted for 44% of ASEAN manufactured exports, up from 29% in 1992-93. The shares are higher still for some countries: 64% for the Philippines in 2005-06 (up from 24% in 1992-93), 53% in Singapore (from 32%) and 51% in Malaysia (from 37%). Over this period, ASEAN's share of world trade in parts and components also rose significantly, from 7.8% to 10.9% (Athukorala and Menon, 2009 ).
Clearly, the management of global production facilities, sourcing inputs to the final product from many countries, is fundamentally incompatible with PTAs: some countries may be signatories to various PTAs, and these agreements are unlikely to be mutually compatible. The response of governments and MNEs in these industries has been to locate such activities in free trade zones, thus placing their operations on a free trade footing. More recently, governments have come to recognize the impracticality of any form of trade barriers -unilateral or preferential -in this segment, through the establishment of the International Technology Agreement (Bhagwati, 2008) , to which the major Southeast Asian electronics exporters are signatories.
(2.2) The ASEAN Economies: an Overview Table 2 summarizes the key socio-economic features of the 10 countries, with are diverse in practically every respect. The richest country, Singapore, has a per capita income of about 50 times the poorest, Cambodia. In PPP terms, the range is narrowed, but is still more than 25:1, larger than for any other regional association in the world. Of course, the range is exaggerated by Singapore, whose per capita income is 5 and 3.5 times that of third ranked Malaysia. But even excluding Singapore (and Brunei), the range is very large, about 11-fold. In terms of economic size, however, Indonesia is the dominant economy, with over 35% of ASEAN GDP, almost double that of second-ranked Thailand. There follows three intermediate ranked economies, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines (with relative sizes depending on which GDP series is employed), followed by the four small mainland states, of which Vietnam is by far the largest. Cambodia and Laos are still officially regarded as 'least developed states', reflecting their poverty and (along with Vietnam) the historical legacy of deep conflict.
( Table 2 about here)
The demographics of the 10 countries also vary considerably. Here also, Indonesia is by far the largest, with 39% of ASEAN's population, followed by three mid-sized populations, in order the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. Myanmar's 50 million is a very approximate estimate. Malaysia is approaching 30 million people, while the remaining four states are considerably smaller. Population densities provide a clue to comparative advantage in land-intensive activities. Apart from the special case of Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest population densities, with the three poor mainland states much less heavily settled. Indonesia's average density of course obscures its huge demographic imbalance, with the main island of Java containing regions with among the highest population densities in the world.
There are also large differences in economic structure, reflecting both levels of development and relative resource endowments. The two poorest Indo China states (and almost certainly Myanmar) are still heavily agrarian economies, with one-third or more of the GDP from agriculture, while the richer economies have largely shifted out of agriculture. Several of the economies have experienced rapid industrialization over the recent decades, with this sector accounting for at least one-quarter of GDP in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Services as expected dominate the Singapore economy. For a complex set of reasons, they also account for more than half of the still low-income Philippine economy.
Welfare indicators correlate closely with per capita income. Thus the HDI indices for Singapore and Brunei are well above that of the others (although internationally their HDI rankings are well below their per capita income rankings), with Malaysia and Thailand a good deal higher than the other six economies. Those for the three poorest mainland states are among the lowest in the world. Poverty incidence, as measured by the percentage of the population living below $2/day, is still very high in these three (again with accurate estimates for Myanmar unavailable), and still over 40% in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Poverty incidence has however fallen rapidly in all cases of sustained rapid growth in the region.
These socio-economic indicators highlight several distinctive features of the ASEAN grouping, and they have important implications for how it operates. ASEAN is unlike any other regional grouping with respect to its balance of economic power. Singapore, by far the richest economy, has less than 1% of the population, and it is ethnically distinct. By contrast, the largest economy, Indonesia, is barely in the middle-income developing group, and its per capita GDP is below the ASEAN average. This contrasts with NAFTA, dominated by one rich economy, and with the European Union, with its four major economies together with a diverse group of member countries on average considerably richer than that of ASEAN. ASEAN also differs from SARC, SADAC and Mercosur in this respect, with India, South Africa and Brazil respectively the dominant economies (though not the richest in the first and third case).
Moreover, owing to its unique historical, political, economic and cultural characteristics, Singapore is unable to provide the leadership that might otherwise have been expected of the country that is the richest and has historically been the most economically dynamic, except by example, in the high quality of economic policy, legal and other institutions, and its superb infrastructure. Indeed, leading security analysts sometimes characterize its principal challenge as 'dealing with vulnerability'. Although referring primarily to its defence and foreign policies, the sentiment also has broader implications for the country's policies, ranging from large defence expenditures to an extraordinarily high savings rates and huge foreign exchange reserves.
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There is also greater diversity in economic structure -and hence scope for intraregional specialization and commerce -than is commonly recognized. There are net food exporters (most of the mainland states) and importers (most of archipelagic Southeast Asia); resource-poor and resource-rich nations (the latter Brunei and Malaysia especially, on a per capita basis); net labour importers (the four higher income states) and net labour exporters; while Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia have advanced R&D capacity and higher education resources, alongside their neighbours with much weaker human capital bases.
The ASEAN economies are diverse not only with respect to their levels of development but also their institutional and commercial policy environments. Three of the economies, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, were classified by SachsWarner as 'always open'. Singapore has never deviated from this open borders approach, apart from a very mild and brief period of import substitution as part of its short-lived union with Malaysia. By contrast, the four poorer economies of mainland Southeast Asia have been largely closed to the international economy, in the case of the three Indo China states until they commenced a historic and increasingly decisive reorientation from plan to market. Indonesia and the Philippines have for extended periods erected high barriers to international trade and investment, but since the mid 1980s have become increasingly open.
The various estimates of openness and the summary indicators of commercial policy regimes in the 10 countries presented in Table 3 confirm these generalizations. With respect to trade/GDP ratios, Singapore is one of the most open economies in the world, with Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia also having figures above 100%. The tariff data show a broadly similar picture, with weighted averages below 10% for most of the economies, and only marginally higher for Cambodia and Vietnam. The higher figures for the latter two economies in part illustrate their success in converting opaque trade barriers into transparent tariffs. Smuggling remains extensive in those economies with remaining trade barriers, long porous borders and weak administrative capacity. Myanmar, Laos and Indonesia stand out in this respect. The dispersions in tariffs across sectors is generally declining, with a switch from above to below-average protection for manufactures observable in several countries. Like tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are generally declining, but they remain significant in some cases for the usual political economy reasons. Highly protected sectors are often those dominated by state-owned enterprises in the former command economies and Indonesia. ( Table 3 about here) Employing the stock of FDI to GDP as a crude measure of openness, Singapore has one of the highest ratios in the world, with very high figures (over 40%) for Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Of course, these indicators of openness do not necessarily imply the existence of secure, transparent and low-corruption business environments. Subjective, perceptions-based indicators, for all their limitations, portray a somewhat different story. For illustration, we also include in Table 3 three widely used comparative indicators: the index of economic freedom, regulatory quality as measured by the World Bank's Governance Indicators, and the Bank's Doing Business series. On these indicators, the rankings generally correlate quite closely with per capita income. Singapore stands far apart from its neighbours, with rankings at or very close to the top in all three series. Brunei follows, with Malaysia and then Thailand some way further behind. Although reforming quickly, the former command economies are still regarded as having uncertain business climates, weak property rights or high-levels of corruption, and in some cases all three. However, in aggregate they do not rank far behind Indonesia and the Philippines, illustrating in turn the slower pace of reform in the latter two. Whereas 15 years ago the original ASEAN-5 group was well advanced on the transition economies, the distinction is now increasingly blurred.
3) 'Old Issues': Merchandise Trade
Two features dominate ASEAN trade. First, the ASEAN economies trade predominantly with the rest of the world. That is, extra-regional trade is much larger than intra-regional trade. Since 1970, the latter has generally constituted between 15% and 30% of total ASEAN trade (Figure 1 ). These seemingly low shares of intra-ASEAN trade have attracted a lot of critical comment, and some have used it to question ASEAN's viability as a regional grouping. An important point to bear in mind in interpreting these shares is the fact that the ASEAN economies are also only a small share of global trade flows. When this scale factor is adjusted for, through the computation of trade intensity measures for instance, the picture that emerges is quite different. For 2006 for example, all intra-ASEAN flows record an index of greater than unity, and many are in the double-digits and range to a maximum of 53.
There is also a general upward trend in the intra-ASEAN trade shares, reflecting the rising importance of the group in world trade. In the earlier period, commodities dominated this trade, with Singapore the entrepot for resource-rich Indonesia and Malaysia. This in turn explained the volatility in shares. While still important, intraregional trade is now considerably more broad-based, with manufactures playing a larger role, increasingly as Singapore-centred global production networks. Note that these statistics refer only to merchandise trade and do not include the fast-growing but poorly measured services trade. It is also important to contrast the much lower intra-ASEAN share with that of the EU figure of around 70%. Since, as will be argued below, most AFTA trade concessions are multilateralized, the observed increase in intra-regional trade shares must be explained by complementarity and market-driven factors rather than deliberate policy measures.
( Figure 1 about here) Second, Singapore dominates intra-ASEAN trade flows, as revealed in Table 4 .
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The largest single trade flow is between Singapore and Malaysia, as it always has been historically. Singapore's trade with Indonesia and Thailand is also very large. The largest non-Singapore trade flows involve the region's second most open economy, Malaysia, with the two neighbours with which it shares a land boundary, Indonesia and Thailand. The matrix also shows the small scale of official trade of the poorer mainland states, although Vietnam is rising fast. The countries also differ with respect to the importance of ASEAN within their total trade. For both Singapore and Malaysia, ASEAN markets constitute more than one-quarter of total exports. The share is much lower for Indonesia, where natural resource exports to extraregional markets are important, and for the Philippines, whose commercial patterns have always been the least ASEAN-centred of the five original member countries.
( Table 4 about here)
Two important implications for the governance of regional economic architecture flow from this analysis. First, it does not make sense for ASEAN to contemplate the formation of a customs union, since the major trade is outside the region. That is, the costs of trade diversion would almost certainly exceed the benefits of trade creation. Second, Singapore's dominance of intra-ASEAN trade flows, and the country's nonnegotiable commitment to open borders, mean that any attempt to set a common external trade regime at anything other than that defined by Singapore is not feasible, since the latter would be a veto player. In other words, a common external ASEAN trade regime would have to be at Singapore levels. This does not necessarily preclude the adoption of free trade within ASEAN alongside differing trade policies for each state. Such an arrangement would imply a two-tier trade policy for all but Singapore, which is technically feasible but would obviously be administratively cumbersome and subject to widespread corruption. In any case, the fact that less than 10% of intra-ASEAN trade avails of AFTA concessions suggests that this approach is virtually irrelevant. The margins of preference between the AFTA and MFN rates are already very low, and the administrative procedures render the AFTA option unattractive. We return to this issue below.
4) 'New issues': Services, FDI and Regional Economic Architecture
ASEAN -AFTA and related initiatives in particular -has had a deeper regional economic integration objective since the early 1990s. What light does its experience shed on the broader question of whether PTAs can accelerate economic integration? The regional trade liberalization experience was discussed above. In this section we address this question with reference to a range of issues beyond the first-round efforts that focused on merchandise trade. Following AFTA, ASEAN has also signed agreements relating to trade in services, intra-regional investment and labour movements. The ASEAN economies are increasingly integrated in all these respects, but they are all market-driven, with little if any formal implementation of the regional initiatives.
11 A word of caution is necessary in interpreting these trade shares. While aggregate trade flows are reasonably accurate, as they can be verified from major OECD trading partner statistics, some intra-ASEAN trade flows are at best approximate, owing to widespread physical and technical smuggling. For many years, Singapore has not released its trade statistics with Indonesia, for fear that any discrepancy with the Indonesian statistics may trigger accusations that the island state is complicit in smuggling. Smuggling from Burma is known to be extensive, as it was in the communist states of Indo China until their major trade liberalizations.
Under the 1995 AFAS agreement, negotiations over the liberalization of services have focused on five sectors, namely financial services, transport, telecommunications, tourism and professional business services. Progress has however been limited, owing to the lack of political commitment to open up the services market, weaknesses in negotiation frameworks, legal restrictions and institutional limitations (Rajan and Sen, 2002 ). These problems have been compounded by the global tendency to liberalize the services sector last, whether in the form of a general market liberalization or specifically privatization and FDI liberalization.
Of course, although it is notoriously difficult to measure, intra-ASEAN service trade is intense, driven by proximity (which generally matters more for services than merchandise trade) and complimentary. In the majority of ASEAN countries, tourists from the region are the major visitors. In financial services and telecommunications, Singapore and Malaysia are major investors throughout the region. The flows of intra-regional education and health services are growing rapidly. These are essentially market-driven transactions, which can be facilitated by simplified visa arrangements (such as the current ASEAN-wide visa-free facility) and other harmonization measures that lower transaction costs. However, it would hardly make sense for ASEAN governments to give preferential access to neighbouring service providers over the best-practice global alternative.
In the case of FDI, there are a number of sequentially related agreements, starting in 1987 with the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, commonly known as the ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA). More than a decade later, the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was signed in October 1998 at the 30 th Meeting of the ASEAN Economics Ministers (AEM). The most significant initiative of the AIA was the preferential, or discriminatory, treatment afforded to ASEAN investors in member countries for a fixed period of time. This preferential treatment was to take the form of access to particular industrial sectors available only to ASEAN member countries on a reciprocal basis. 12 However, in 2007, the 39 th Meeting of the AEM effectively nullified this preferential treatment when the provisions were extended to foreign-owned ASEAN based investors. In February 2009, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) was signed, intended to be more comprehensive in that it deals with liberalization, promotion, facilitation and protection, and adopting also a single negative list approach.
Regional investment flows have risen rapidly over this period. But these are predominantly market-driven, and there is no evidence that they have been induced by the special provisions offered under the AIA and ACIA initiatives. That is, although some of ASEAN's investment provisions may represent a medium for regional protectionism or sectoral sheltering rather than liberalization, in practice they appear to have little impact (Jarvis et al, 2009 ).
Singapore, with its extraordinarily high savings rate and international reserves, and its large government-linked corporate sector, has emerged as a major foreign investor, globally and regionally. Its scale is such that in several ASEAN countries it is among the top three foreign investors. Its investments are in a broad range of sectors, including banking, telecoms, hotels, and real estate. As the major regional headquarters for MNEs, it is also a base for these companies investing elsewhere in the region. Malaysia too has become a major investor abroad, with a similar set of drivers at work -high savings rates, loss of comparative advantage in labourintensive activities, and an activist GLC sector. For example, both countries have emerged as major investors in Indonesia over the past decade in a diverse range of sectors, including banking, palm oil, hotels, and telecommunications. Thailand is now a major investor in the small neighbouring Indo China economies in a wide range of service, manufacturing and resource-based activities, and despite the ThaiCambodian hostilities. Table 5 provides estimates of realized FDI by for each ASEAN economy by source -ASEAN and extra-ASEAN -for the period 2006-08, which are indicative of longerterm shares. Extra-ASEAN economies dominate these flows, and are typically five to seven times larger than those originating from within ASEAN. This applies to all economies, including the mainland transition economies which, in the early reform phase, received much of their FDI from neighbouring ASEAN countries. It also needs to be noted that the intra-ASEAN share in total FDI flows to the region is less than the corresponding share for trade. This is to be expected given that, among the ASEAN-10, only Singapore is an outward investor of any significant scale. The implication is that preferential investment schemes within ASEAN are unlikely to make economic sense for the foreseeable future.
( Table 5 about In neither case is there a deliberate preference for workers from other ASEAN countries, but in practice proximity and ethnic/cultural similarities result in the majority of these foreign workers coming from neighbouring countries. This is particularly the case with Malaysia, where about 75% of the workers are estimated to be from Indonesia. Given the former's delicate ethnic mix, it is widely believed that the dominant Malay community tacitly supports these large inflows. The Philippines is the second largest source of migrant workers, with particularly large inflows to the East Malaysian states. Table 6 provides one set of estimates of the stock of temporary intra-ASEAN migrants in 2006. Recognizing that they are almost certainly a considerable underestimate, they highlight the major flows. The three richer economies, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, all with broadly open international labour markets, are the major recipients, while Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar are the major senders. Among the 5.5 million recorded workers, three large concentrations stand out, accounting for about two-thirds of the total: migrants from Myanmar working in Thailand, Indonesians in Malaysia and Malaysians in Singapore. Malaysia is unusual in that it is both a significant recipient and sender, with the former predominantly lowskilled workers and the latter higher skilled. Some of the other flows, while small in aggregate, are significant for the countries' concerned. For example, about 10% of the Lao workforce is estimated to work in Thailand, on a permanent or casual basis.
( Table 6 about here) (4.2) The Rise of PTAs As noted, with the exception of ASEAN itself, the countries of Southeast Asia generally eschewed preferential trading arrangements through until the late 1990s, preferring a combination of multilateral and unilateral measures. The former had resulted in a global trading environment that generally supported export expansion with few serious trade barriers, apart from some agricultural and labour-intensive manufactured products. There were meanwhile a series of significant domestic liberalizations in the 1980s and 1990s, most particularly in the three communist states, but also in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Since 2000, there has been little progress with multilateral liberalization, and domestic reform has slowed significantly. Not unrelated to these developments has been the proliferation of various forms of PTAs. Table 7 lists each ASEAN country's participation in PTAs as at January 2010: 91 PTAs have been signed or are under implementation, 32 are under negotiation, and 36 are proposed. These numbers include a variety of agreements, ranging from the comprehensive to the so-called 'trade-lite', and thus they are not strictly comparable.
( Table 7 about here) Singapore has been the major ASEAN adopter of PTAs, with 20 concluded, and 14 under negotiation or proposed. It accounts for over one-quarter of the regional PTAs under implementation. Its government decided to be pro-active in this commercial diplomacy, frustrated with the slow pace of ASEAN and alert to commercial opportunities elsewhere. It might appear puzzling that free-trade Singapore would embark on this route, since it has little to offer by way of reciprocal market access. However, it has made some concessions in its more protected services sector, and it has used the PTAs to extract useful concessions from partner countries (For example, extensive access to Indian landing rights for Singapore Airlines.) It has also suited other countries to engage with Singapore as a 'training exercise' in preparation for negotiations with larger, more complex economies. Singapore is seen as small, non-threatening, and with a non-existent agricultural sector, traditionally the area of greatest sensitivity in trade negotiations. Singapore's participation in these PTAs has attracted subdued criticism from its ASEAN partners, but it has not seriously threatened the viability of ASEAN.
Thailand has also been active with PTAs, particularly under the prime ministership of Thaksin. This is somewhat ironical since, although traditionally a relatively open economy, Thailand has achieved little progress with its own trade reform since the 1980s. The governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and the other four mainland Southeast Asian states have thus far engaged very little in PTAs, reflecting mainly their concerns with domestic reform and a generally reactive approach to international commercial diplomacy. The smaller transition economies, in particular, have struggled to cope with the demands of formalizing their trade regimes, converting the many implicit and obscure NTBs into tariffs. This is also in the context of securing membership of the WTO (except for Laos, which is still an applicant), then implementing the formal requirements, all in an institutional environment of very limited analytical expertise in their bureaucracies and many competing demands from the international donor community.
Three general observations need to be made about these agreements. First, they vary considerably in their scope, depth and coverage. The larger economic powers, notably Japan and the US, are able to extract specific requirements, for example, the exclusion of sensitive agricultural products in the case of the former, and intellectual property rights in the latter. Where ASEAN rules apply, the agreements are more likely to be multilateralized and have less restrictive ROOs. Some of the agreements are very minor, and have little functional significance.
13 Second, there is considerable variation in the capacity of the ASEAN governments to implement these agreements. Singapore, for example, has a high-quality analytical and negotiating capacity, while Laos has practically none of these resources at its disposal and is struggling to satisfy the requirements for WTO membership. PTAs involving the transition countries are a clear distraction from the more important task of general trade reform.
Thirdly, there is the issue of whether these and the broader regional initiatives discussed in the following section will collapse into a plurilateral, pan-Asian agreement. This approach has gained further impetus from the October 2009 East Asian Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand, where the Japanese and Australian prime ministers put forward proposals for an ASEAN plus six and APEC-wide FTA respectively, and with the former receiving ASEAN support. Both proposals are substantially driven by political and strategic objectives. What if any contribution do they make to clearing up the current, distorted trade policy landscape?
According to one school of thought, these multiple and overlapping PTAs could be consolidated into a single East Asian PTA. However, details of how these PTAs can somehow be folded into a much broader multilateral agreement remain sparse. It is also perplexing that advocates of this approach often argue that bilateral agreements are able to achieve much deeper integration because only two parties are involved, but then inexplicably expect the same results from a consolidated agreement involving many more parties.
Even if the 'consolidation approach' may be able to address the proliferation of often overlapping PTAs, and make the best of the current mess, other options could achieve the same outcome without creating yet another FTA. Two such alternatives include the multilateralization of preferential accords, and the dilution of ROOs. The original members of ASEAN have employed the multilateralization approach with success, and today close to 90% of the preferences of their PTA are available to non-members on an MFN basis. This is a model of how so-called 'open regionalism' can work. As a result, overall tariffs have fallen sharply on trade with all countries, because the PTA liberalization program has been more ambitious and rapid than the WTO alone could have delivered. Consequently, utilization rates of remaining preferences have also fallen to negligible levels. Joining a new East Asian PTA would be a step backwards, as it would bring this process of multilateralizing preferences to a halt. 14 If members of the PTA are not yet ready to give up reciprocal preferences, then liberalizing ROOs could be an interim step in preparing the groundwork for that process. This could be done by harmonization, and expanding the so-called 'rules of cumulation' (ie, the number of countries whose value added qualifies). If rules of cumulation are sufficiently expanded and then harmonized across different agreements, the outcome could no longer require formal multilateralization of tariff accords. Here again, a new and larger PTA is not required, and it would in fact be a less desirable option.
Both these alternatives could be applied to intra and extra-regional PTAs. The consolidation approach, on the other hand, is only designed for intra-regional PTAs. But most PTAs are extra-regional. An ASEAN+3 PTA (ie, ASEAN plus Japan, China, Korea) would address only 6% of all PTAs of the countries concerned, while an ASEAN+6 PTA (ie, ASEAN+3 plus Australia, New Zealand, India) could potentially neutralize a quarter of them. But these figures in turn prompt the question as to why most PTAs are extra-regional to begin with? A common explanation is that they are designed to restore market access in traditional trading partners that may have joined a regional PTA (see Menon, 2007b) . If this is true, then a new, consolidated East Asian FTA may itself spark a new wave of extra-regional PTAs. With more countries outside the region than inside, an East Asian PTA could actually be counter-productive, leading perversely to an increase in the total number of PTAs. 'Consolidation' therefore does not appear to provide a solution, and may actually contribute to the problem, by adding another strand to the spaghetti bowl or, worse still, inducing a new wave of extra-regional PTAs. (2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015) . Given the diversity within ASEAN, and sensitivities regarding different issues\sectors, it was agreed that liberalization of goods, capital, and (skilled) labour flows proceed at different speeds according to member countries' readiness, national policy objectives, and levels of economic and financial development. Thus, despite the blueprint and the various priority actions and schedules, it remains to be seen to what extent concrete liberalization initiatives will be implemented, or whether it will remain essentially a vision statement.
ASEAN also participates in a range of broader regional and multilateral initiatives. These include APEC and WTO-based negotiations (eg, the current Doha Round). Its official position is that it regards these processes as consistent with ASEAN objectives and therefore supports them. However, in practice, ASEAN does not appear to have played an effective catalytic role in recent years. One ASEAN country, Indonesia, is a member of the G20, which appears to be morphing into the principal global forum for addressing key development issues, such as the measures to prevent a recurrence of financial crises, and climate change. It is too early to judge whether Indonesia attempts to represent ASEAN interests at these meetings. Institutionally, ASEAN also has observer stats at the G20. In sum, ASEAN is moving cautiously and uncertainly towards being at the centre of a potentially large, yet still undefined, economic grouping.
Meanwhile, ASEAN has been an active participant in the ongoing, though still largely inconclusive, discussions concerning broader macroeconomic coordination. Following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, East Asia launched several inter-related regional cooperation initiatives, particularly for early detection and management of financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities, as well as broader macroeconomic coordination. Some of these have developed faster than others, and all have occurred within the framework of APT, with the involvement of China, Korea and Japan.
The three major initiatives undertaken by the finance ministers of APT are the introduction of a regional economic review and policy dialogue process (ASEAN+3 ERPD); the establishment of a regional reserve pooling arrangement, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI); and the development of local-currency bond markets, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). The first two were launched in May 2000 and the latter, which has progressed at the slowest pace, three years later.
The ASEAN+3 ERPD mechanism is intended to improve information sharing, promote dialogue among policymakers, and foster collaboration on financial, monetary, and fiscal issues of common interest. Initially, the CMI involved an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) involving all ASEAN members, and a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSA) and repurchase facilities among ASEAN+3. The size of the CMI fund has grown from $36.5 billion in 2001-2005, to $84 billion in 2008, and to $120 billion in May 2009. Since its inception, however, it was clear that the CMI was much more than this, in that it was actually an institutional mechanism to pursue further negotiations, rather than a final agreement on swap arrangements.
The biggest step forward took place in May 2009, when the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers (AFMM+3) agreed on the governing mechanisms and implementation plan for the CMI multilateralization (CMIM). Japan and China would contribute identical shares of the total reserve pool (32%), together with Korea (16%) and ASEAN countries (20%). The AFMM+3 also agreed to establish an ancillary institution in the form of an independent regional surveillance unit to monitor and analyze regional economies and support CMIM decision-making -the Asian Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), to commence in May 2011 in Singapore. Looking forward, the success and relevance of this fund will depend on boosting its size from its current $120 billion, an amount that is unlikely to be sufficient in the event of a major regional crisis. Moreover, as long as countries continue their attempts to 'self-insure' in the form of accumulating very large (and low return) foreign exchange reserves, it is unlikely to play much of a role. Much will also depend on how AMRO performs, and crucial issues of surveillance and conditionality are operationalized. ASEAN has significant achievements to its credit. First, it still exists as an effective functioning entity, which is more than can be said for several other past and present regional organizations in the developing world. Second, for a region characterized by great diversity and considerable past tension, Southeast Asia has by and large been free of major conflict since the mid 1980s, as the three Indo China states progressively re-entered the regional and international mainstream. Of course, border skirmishes persist, the creation of East Timor as an independent nation state was a challenging experience, and Burma remains an international pariah state beyond the reach of ASEAN diplomacy. Third, and most important, ASEAN in aggregate has been a region of rapid economic development and rising living standards. One can debate the direction of causality between this outcome and the establishment of the Association, but undeniably the determination of the region's leaders to forge more harmonious relations has facilitated economic development. The engagement with and the nurturing of the three Indo China states in their early stage of economic liberalization, after decades of acrimony and one of the most destructive wars in recent memory, has been a signal achievement.
Fourth, ASEAN has been diplomatically skillful in effectively playing 'balance of power' politics (Acharya, 2009 ). There is no clear economic and political leadership in East Asia, with the economic giants of the past and the future -Japan and China respectively -engaged in a battle of constant diplomatic rivalry. Courted by both powers, ASEAN has thus been able to advance its own interests considerably, and become either the arbiter or driver of almost every major initiative on regional commercial and security architecture. ASEAN's pivotal position has been maintained as Asian regionalism has extended to embrace South Asia, and in particular the inclusion of the third major Asian power, India.
Yet, on the other side of the ledger, ASEAN has not progressed very far in terms of becoming a formal economic entity. This proposition can be illustrated with reference to the standard theory of customs unions (Table 8 ). In over four decades, it has not progressed beyond the first phase, of loosely exchanging trade preferences, while still maintaining their separate, and still quite variable, trade regimes. As noted, it is very unlikely to progress to the next stage, of a customs union with common external tariffs. Deeper integration, affecting factor markets and a common macroeconomic policy regime a la the EU, is even further off the horizon. (Table 8 about here) Moreover, ASEAN runs the risk of being consigned to the status of a diplomatic talkshop. In the words of one its former Secretary Generals, in a frank report to leaders: 'Regional economic integration seems to have become stuck in framework agreements, work programmes and master plans.' (Severino, 2006, p. 247) The Association has a long history of issuing declarations, action plans and charters, yet with limited capacity -and in some cases arguably intention -for implementation. It has generally prevaricated on whether to become a formal customs union. It has developed a plan for labour market integration, while some of the largest labour movements in the world (relative to the size of the recipient economy) have occurred outside this framework. Even after one of the deepest economic crises in the region's history, the Association was unable to develop a set of emergency support mechanisms. At its root, the 'ASEAN Way' is an institutionalized mechanism that renders very unlikely the prospect of a fundamental change in direction. The most likely outcome is that the country's policy regimes will converge over time, to the point where preferential arrangements become redundant. As the region's commercial hub, Singapore sets the standard in this respect, and one to which the lower-income members of ASEAN might aspire.
And so it is not surprising that ASEAN's greatest achievement in the economic sphere has been more to do with what AFTA has indirectly induced rather than mandated. Recognizing that most of the region's trade is extra-regional, in order to minimize the potential costs of trade diversion the original ASEAN members have been reducing their external tariffs in conjunction with reduced barriers to intra-ASEAN trade. The ASEAN-6 countries have also undertaken several waves of multilateralizing preferences, where they have voluntarily offered their AFTA concessions to non-members on a non-discriminatory basis. When the preferences are fully multilateralized, the margins of preference are zero, as is the potential for trade diversion. This was the case for more than two-thirds of the tariff lines for the ASEAN-6 countries through to 2002 (Feridhanusetyawan, 2002) , and the proportion has increased since then (Menon, 2007a) . Measures ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom score for each country. 30.00 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 0 
